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Notes
Repercussions of China’s High-Tech Rise:
Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights in China
Emily Gische*
China’s growing technological prowess and role as a global economic player has vastly
increased the number of U.S. and international companies doing business in China.
Despite the country’s continued building of a basic intellectual property infrastructure,
IP violations remain a common complaint of foreign businesses. This Note analyzes
China’s developing IP policy in the context of World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement 362, which the United States initiated against China in 2007. The dispute
concerned the protection and enforcement of IP rights and involved both copyright and
trademark issues. This Note also examines subsequent national IP strategy
pronouncements issued by both China’s State Council and China’s highest court, the
Supreme People’s Court, to assess the extent to which they remedy the issues that arose
in the WTO dispute. In addition to these materials, this Note analyzes the likelihood
that China will be able to implement its IP strategy. This Note concludes that although
the Chinese government is shifting to a more proactive IP policy, the lack of effective
law enforcement continues to serve as a major obstacle to implementation. Nascent
pressure from domestic IP creators, international pressure, and most important,
changes in China’s domestic economy all act as counterbalancing forces to offset the
enforcement problem.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. B.A., Stanford
University, 2007. I would like to thank Professor Keith Hand for his invaluable feedback throughout
the Note-writing process, the editors and staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their work on this Note,
and my family for their constant love and support.
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Introduction
Intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) in China have consistently
been a priority for the United States in recent years. On April 10, 2007,
the United States filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), requesting consultations with China concerning the protection
1
and enforcement of IPRs. The complaint involved both copyright and
trademark issues. The dispute, known as Dispute Settlement 362
(“DS362”), concerned: (1) the thresholds that must be met in order for
certain acts of trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy to be

1. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, ¶ 1.1, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009). To ensure compliance with its agreements, the
WTO operates a dispute settlement mechanism, which consists of a two-tiered international tribunal
that determines if violations of WTO law have occurred and authorizes trade sanctions against those
who do not remedy their violations. Jan Bohanes & Adrian Emch, WTO-China IPR Case: A Mixed
Result, China L. & Prac., Mar. 16, 2009, at 19. If a WTO member believes that another member’s
conduct is in violation of WTO rules, that WTO member can bring its case to a panel of experts that
adjudicates impartially on the basis of WTO law. Id.
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subject to criminal procedures and penalties (the “criminal prosecution
thresholds claim”); (2) goods that infringe IPRs and that are confiscated
by Chinese customs authorities, particularly the disposal of such goods
following removal of their infringing features (the “customs measures
claim”); and (3) the denial of copyright and related rights protection and
enforcement for creative works of authorship, sound recordings, and
performances that have not been authorized for publication or
2
distribution within China (the “copyright law claim”). The first claim
concerned criminal prosecution thresholds in both trademark and
copyright matters, the second concerned mainly trademark infringement,
3
and the third exclusively involved copyright protection. On January 26,
4
2009, the Dispute Panel Report was made public. Neither China nor the
5
United States appealed. China accepted the findings and negotiated with
6
the United States to implement them by March 2010.
After the United States filed its complaint in 2007, China issued
several official pronouncements regarding its IP policy. On June 5, 2008,
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) issued the
7
“Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy.” The Outline
covered a wide range of IPR issues, from encouraging the
commercialization and utilization of IPRs to improving IP law
8
enforcement. After the Outline was issued, the Supreme People’s Court
(“SPC”) of the PRC set forth several opinions, notices, and circulars
9
relating to IPRs in 2009 and 2010.

2. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2.2–2.4.
3. Id.
4. China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
World Trade Org. (May 26, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (Issued by the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China on June 5, 2008), Chinese Gov’t’s Official Web Portal (June 21, 2008),
http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm [hereinafter Outline].
8. Id.
9. Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Standards Concerning Jurisdiction of
the Grassroots People’s Courts over Intellectual Property Civil Cases of First Instance (promulgated
by the Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 28, 2010) (iSinoLaw) (China); Provisions of the Supreme
People’s Court on the Division of Work in the Trial of Administrative Intellectual Property Cases
Involving the Authorization and Determination of Rights over Patent, Trademark, etc. (adopted by
the 1469th Meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court, June 22, 2009)
(Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://eng.chinalawinfo.com/NetLaw/display.aspx?db=law&sen=
rLdDdW4drLdDdWrdrhdydWdd/Dd6dW4d9DdxdWcdrLdGdWud/ddFdWhd/DdwdWudrhdDdWdd
9D7vdCrdId7Xdmrdsd7MdCydHD7FdWudrDd5dWLd/Ld+&Id=7724&; Notice of the Supreme
People’s Court on Issuing the Opinions on Several Issues Concerning Intellectual Property Trials
Serving the Overall Objective Under the Current Economic Situation (promulgated by the Supreme
People’s Court, Apr. 21, 2009) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter Apr. 21, 2009 SPC Notice],
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7703; Opinions of the Supreme
People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property
Strategy (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Mar. 29, 2009) (Lawinfochina) (China),
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Using the issues in DS362 as a framework, this Note analyzes
China’s developing IP policy. This Note also examines the Outline and
SPC materials in the context of DS362 to determine to what extent
China’s IP strategy and specific requirements remedy any of these issues.
In addition to analyzing the Outline and SPC materials, this Note
provides an analysis of how likely it is that the PRC will be able to
implement these overall goals.
Examination of the Outline and related SPC materials indicates that
China’s IP policy is becoming more proactive and pro-innovation,
especially with regard to its trademark policy, as the country focuses its
efforts on creating a high-tech economy. Although the Chinese
government is shifting to this proactive policy in terms of its national
pronouncements, the lack of effective law enforcement continues to serve
as a major obstacle to full implementation of its IPR goals. However,
nascent pressure from domestic IP creators, international pressure
(especially from the United States), and changes in China’s domestic
economy act as counterbalancing forces to help offset the enforcement
problem. As China continues to grow and become an integral part of the
world economy, it becomes increasingly important for China and the rest
of the international community, especially the United States, to be able
to do business together without rampant IP violations.
This Note is divided into five parts. Part I provides a brief
background of China’s IP law development. Part II discusses the three
claims in DS362. Part III sets forth China’s immediate and concrete
implementation of the adopted WTO recommendations and reports.
Part IV analyzes China’s response and identification of the overall issues
that DS362 raised. Finally, Part V examines the implementation—and
potential roadblocks—of the goals set forth in the Outline and SPC
materials.

I. The Development of Intellectual Property Law
in China
IP law and policy in China is, for the most part, a relatively recent
development. Most of the relevant progress has occurred within the past
10
thirty years. Following China’s reform and opening policy post-Mao,
the country began developing its IP law system, resulting in the creation
11
of the Trademark, Patent, and Copyright Laws. China also joined all of

available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7546 [hereinafter Mar. 29, 2009
SPC Opinion].
10. Andrea Wechsler, Intellectual Property Law in the P.R. China: A Powerful Economic
Tool for Innovation and Development 32 (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop., Competition & Tax L.,
Research Paper No. 09-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354546.
11. See Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress, Aug. 23, 1982) (last amended Oct. 27, 2001),
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the major IPR conventions, including the World Intellectual Property
Organization—a specialized agency of the United Nations—in 1980 and
12
the Berne Convention in 1992.
Scholars have posited several motivations on China’s part for
creating and developing a comprehensive IP protection system. One such
13
motivation was to facilitate foreign investment. China and the
international community alike assumed that the introduction of IP
protection standards would help boost economic growth within the
14
country. An additional motivation was external and foreign pressure
that led to IP reform, namely the prospect of joining the international
15
trade community through membership in the WTO. Because China
16
joined the WTO in 2001 —several years after its initial creation of IP
laws—this prospect was a significant motivation for China to continue to
develop and amend its IP system. In addition to possible WTO
membership, the United States was a constant force in spurring increased
17
protection of foreign IP interests in China.
The prospect of WTO accession has resulted in concrete IP
developments within China. China has made several efforts to ensure
compliance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
18
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) as a result of its WTO accession. TRIPS
provides a legal framework for protection of IPRs by incorporating the
principles of other major international conventions and prescribing
certain procedures and remedies that WTO members must make
19
available to its domestic IPR holders. In this vein, China made
amendments to all of its major IP laws, including the Patent Law in 2000,
20
the Trademark Law in 2001, and the Copyright Law in 2001. For

available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws11.htm; Patent Law of the People’s Republic
of China (promulgated by the Fourth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National
People’s Congress, Mar. 12, 1984) (last amended Dec. 27, 2008), available at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/
laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html; Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China
(promulgated by the Fifteenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s
Congress, Sept. 7, 1990) (last amended Oct. 27, 2001), available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/
laws/laws10.htm [hereinafter Copyright Law 2001].
12. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 32.
13. Veronica Weinstein & Dennis Fernandez, Recent Developments in China’s Intellectual
Property Laws, 3 Chinese J. Int’l L. 227, 228 (2004); Julia Ya Qin, The Impact of WTO Accession on
China’s Legal System: Trade, Investment and Beyond 20–22 (Wayne St. U. L. Sch. Legal Stud.,
Research
Paper
Series
No.
07-15,
2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=985321.
14. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 35.
15. Id. at 37; see Qin, supra note 13, at 20.
16. Member Information: China and the WTO, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited May 1, 2012).
17. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 37.
18. Qin, supra note 13, at 21.
19. Id. at 20–21.
20. Id. at 21.
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example, the Patent Law was modified to shift the burden of proof of
21
infringement to the defendant, as required by TRIPS. The Trademark
Law was amended to protect prior rights in order to implement the
22
corresponding TRIPS requirement. The Copyright Law was modified to
extend the owner’s rights to include the right to limit online transmission
23
of the copyrighted material. Specific IP violations have been added to
the criminal code, as have administrative and civil remedies, and a
24
special IP adjudication division has been created in the People’s Courts.
Despite these developments and basic IP protection infrastructure,
IP violations are still a major problem in China today. Such violations
remain one of the most frequently cited complaints of foreign companies
25
doing business in China. Most recently, the U.S. clean energy company
American Superconductor brought suit against Chinese wind turbine
maker Sinovel for more than $400 million in damages, alleging that
Sinovel and its employees gained access to some of its wind turbine
26
software codes and used them without authorization. This case is only
the latest in a series of lawsuits that American Superconductor has
27
brought against Sinovel.
Foreign businesses have identified several IPR enforcement
problems, such as the lack of coordination among the agencies responsible
for IP protection and enforcement, local protectionism, inadequate
personnel training, and insufficient administrative, civil, and criminal
28
thresholds for punishment. In October 2005, the United States
requested more information from China regarding IPR infringement
levels and enforcement activities in order to evaluate China’s efforts to
29
improve IPR enforcement since its accession to the WTO. China
provided only limited information in response, and by April 2007 it
became clear to the United States that bilateral discussions were not
30
adequately progressing. The United States then decided to file DS362,
alleging that China had failed to protect IPRs according to TRIPS
standards.

21. Weinstein & Fernandez, supra note 13, at 228–29.
22. Id. at 229.
23. Id. at 230.
24. Qin, supra note 13, at 21.
25. Id.; Office of U.S. Trade Rep., 2010 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance 5
(2010) [hereinafter USTR 2010 Report to Congress]; Office of U.S. Trade Rep., 2010 Special 301
Rep. 19 (2010) [hereinafter USTR 2010 Special 301 Report]; Rogier Creemers, The Effects of WTO
Case DS362 on Audiovisual Media Piracy in China, 31 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 568, 568–59 (2009).
26. Leslie Hook, AMSC to Sue Sinovel in Beijing Court, Fin. Times (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/b5e190c8-05db-11e1-a079-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nWzK9xj1.
27. Id.
28. Qin, supra note 13, at 21; see USTR 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 25, at 20–21.
29. USTR 2010 Report to Congress, supra note 25, at 85.
30. Id.
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II. The Claims in WTO Dispute Settlement 362
A. Criminal Prosecution Thresholds Claim
The first claim in DS362 involved thresholds for criminal
infringement. The United States argued that China’s legal thresholds for
considering infringement to be a criminal offense were too high,
effectively creating a safe harbor for widespread “commercial scale”
31
infringement. The United States also alleged that the lack of criminal
procedures and penalties for commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy
as a result of the thresholds was inconsistent with China’s obligations
32
under Articles 41.1 and 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 41.1 deals
with enforcement of IPRs and mandates that TRIPS members have
enforcement procedures in place to permit actions against IP infringement,
33
including preventative and deterrent remedies. Article 61, dealing with
criminal procedures, provides in part: “Members shall provide for
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of
wil[l]ful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial
34
scale.” China established these thresholds through the Criminal Law of
35
the PRC and subsequent interpretations by the SPC. The trademark
provisions dealt with the use of a counterfeit trademark, the sale of
counterfeit trademark commodities, forgery of trademarks, and the sale
36
of forged trademarks. The copyright provisions involved thresholds for
criminal copyright infringement and the sale of copyright-infringing
37
reproductions.
The WTO’s findings were not a clear win for either country. The
WTO Panel rejected the United States’ claim because the United States
did not provide sufficient data or evidence for products, markets, or
other factors that would demonstrate what constituted commercial scale
38
in China’s marketplace. This rejection illustrates the relatively high
39
evidence threshold for WTO challenges under TRIPS Article 61.
Namely, the WTO has specified that Article 61 requires a product and
market-specific demonstration of what constitutes an operation on a
40
commercial scale.

31. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.482.
32. Id. ¶ 3.1.
33. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 2.2.
36. Id. ¶¶ 7.399–.407.
37. Id. ¶¶ 7.408–.415.
38. Id. ¶ 7.617.
39. Bohanes & Emch, supra note 1, at 20.
40. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.630.
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B. Customs Measures Claim
The second claim involved issues of trademark law and customs
regulations. The United States argued that Chinese customs regulations
did not give Chinese customs authorities the power to order disposal of
41
infringing goods, which is required by TRIPS. Specifically, the United
States alleged that the requirement in the Chinese customs regulations
that infringing goods be released into the channels of commerce under
the circumstances set forth in the regulations is inconsistent with China’s
42
obligations under Articles 46 and 59 of TRIPS. Articles 46 and 59 both
deal with remedies and prohibit the removal of a trademark and
subsequent sale of the confiscated counterfeit good by customs
43
authorities.
The WTO Panel found in favor of the United States on its customs
claim. The Panel found that with respect to imports, the way in which
China’s customs authorities auctioned these goods was inconsistent with
TRIPS because it permitted the sale of goods after the removal of the
44
trademark in more than just exceptional cases. While the Panel found in
favor of the United States by deciding that the simple removal of a
counterfeited trademark was inconsistent with TRIPS, this finding was
45
limited to auctions of products and did not include donations. Donation
of infringing products to charitable organizations, however, is the most
46
common disposal method used by Chinese customs authorities. Because
there is no requirement that Chinese customs authorities ensure that
such donations do not eventually enter the stream of commerce,
47
infringing products can re-enter the market.
C. Copyright Law Claim
The third claim exclusively involved issues of copyright law. The
claim concerned Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law, which the
United States argued denied copyright protection to works prohibited
48
for publication or distribution. Copyright law in China is the result of
49
many compromises among different factions within the legislature. One
such compromise reflected a desire by some within the Chinese
Communist Party that the Copyright Law be used as a way to control

41. Id. ¶ 7.197.
42. Id. ¶¶ 7.197, 7.254.
43. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33, arts. 46, 59.
44. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.393.
45. Id. ¶ 7.365; Leah Chan Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory: The Chinese Trademark
Law, 100 Trademark Rep. 964, 1016 (2010).
46. Grinvald, supra note 45, at 1016.
47. Id.
48. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 2.4.
49. Creemers, supra note 25, at 568.
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content. This compromise resulted in Article 4, the first sentence of
which reads: “Works the publication and/or distribution of which is
50
prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law.”
The claim and resultant WTO findings concerned China’s review
process for copyright protection, which determines whether the content
of a work is prohibited under Chinese law on various grounds. Examples
of such grounds are that a work is against fundamental principles
established in the Chinese Constitution, that it is of a “superstitious” or
51
“immoral” nature, or that it promotes gambling or violence. Works or
portions of works that fail this review process are denied protection
52
under the Copyright Law. China sought to justify its denial of copyright
protection for works that did not pass this review process under
Article 17 of the Berne Convention, incorporated in TRIPS by
53
reference. Article 17 entitles a government to “permit, to control, or to
prohibit . . . the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work . . . in
regard to which the competent authority may find it necessary to exercise
54
that right.” The WTO Panel disagreed with China’s defense, however,
and stated that while a government’s rights under Article 17 of the Berne
Convention may interfere with the exercise of certain rights by the
copyright holder, a government cannot eliminate all of those rights for a
55
particular work via censorship.
These conclusions led to a finding in favor of the United States on
its copyright claim. The Panel found that China’s failure to protect
copyright in prohibited works that are banned because of their illegal
content is inconsistent with the Berne Convention as incorporated in
56
TRIPS. Article 9(1) of TRIPS, which incorporates Article 5(1) of the
Berne Convention, requires governments to grant copyright protection
for qualifying works and to have procedures in place to enforce such
57
protection. The WTO Panel also rejected China’s argument regarding a
58
distinction between copyright and copyright protection. The Panel
stated that China did not explain how rights holders would assert any
type of copyright if protection were denied, which could result in
59
copyright becoming a “phantom right.” The Panel’s findings in this
regard pertained only to works that had failed content review and to the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. (quoting Copyright Law 2001, supra note 11, art. 4).
Bohanes & Emch, supra note 1, at 19.
Id.
Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.120.
Bohanes & Emch, supra note 1, at 19.
Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.127.
Id. ¶ 7.191.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33, art. 9(1).
Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.67.
Id.
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deleted portions of works that had been edited to pass content review.
The Panel did not find that the United States had made a successful case
with regard to works that were never submitted for or were in the
61
process of content review. The Panel concluded by recommending that
62
China bring the Copyright Law into compliance with TRIPS.

III. China’s Immediate Compliance with WTO Findings
China has largely complied with the specific findings of the WTO
Panel, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative
63
(“USTR”) has acknowledged China’s compliance with the WTO rulings.
According to the WTO, China provided notice on March 19, 2010, that it
has successfully implemented the WTO Panel’s recommendations and
64
now conformed to WTO law. No compliance proceedings have been
65
initiated since this notification.
China implemented the WTO findings by way of legislative reform.
China reported that on February 26, 2010, the Standing Committee of
the Eleventh National People’s Congress approved the amendments to
66
the Copyright Law. Article 4 of the Copyright Law was amended to
read, “Copyright holders shall not violate the Constitution or laws or
jeopardize public interests when exercising their copyright. The State
shall supervise and administrate the publication and dissemination of
67
works in accordance with the law.” Additionally, on March 17, 2010, the
State Council adopted the decision to revise the Regulations for Customs
68
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. The WTO noted that China
had therefore completed all necessary domestic legislative procedures for
69
implementing the Panel recommendations and rulings.
Although on its face it does not seem that the legislative amendment
will change much in practice, the USTR seems to have accepted China’s
efforts to implement the Panel recommendations as satisfactory. Because
China did not appeal and the WTO found in favor of the United States in
the majority of its claims, the United States obtained at the very least a
symbolic win. In its latest report, the USTR notes that it “continues to
monitor China’s implementation of the DSB recommendations and

60. Id. ¶ 7.103.
61. Id.
62. Id. ¶ 8.4.
63. USTR 2010 Report to Congress, supra note 25, at 5.
64. World Trade Org., supra note 4.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Committee
of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/cn/cn031en.pdf.
68. World Trade Org., supra note 4.
69. Id.
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rulings in this dispute,” but then launches directly into a discussion of a
70
subsequent WTO dispute regarding market access barriers. The United
States made its views on these issues clear through this particular dispute
settlement and then decided to pursue more pressing matters.

IV. China’s Identification of and Response to Intellectual
Property Rights Issues in DS362
China’s overall IPR development is more nuanced than just its
legislative efforts in response to DS362. The WTO Panel itself noted that
it was evaluating only whether certain Chinese measures violated the
country’s TRIPS obligations, and that it was not tasked with ascertaining
whether or what level of piracy exists in China, nor reviewing the
71
advantages and disadvantages of strict IPR enforcement. The latest
phase of China’s IP development, predominantly occurring within the
twenty-first century, demonstrates that China has realized that
globalization requires the protection of its own IP on an international
72
stage, in addition to the domestic protection of foreign IP. This
realization has also brought about a shift in China’s IP policy and
development, from one that was reactive to its international obligations
to one that is now more proactive and pro-innovation in its approach to
73
IP protection and enforcement. This shift is likely due to China’s move
74
toward a high-tech economy. A recent study stated that China is
expected to pass both the United States and Japan in new patent
75
applications. Such reports are evidence of China’s increase in research
and development and the country’s efforts to encourage innovation.
A prominent example of such a proactive, pro-innovation approach
is the PRC’s Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy,
adopted in June 2008. The Outline comprehensively addresses issues of
IP protection, enforcement, development, and public awareness of
76
IPRs. One of the driving motivations behind the Outline is to “improve
China’s capacity for independent innovation and aid in efforts to make
77
China an innovative country.” The following Subparts discuss ways in

70. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2011 Special 301 Report 16 (2011).
71. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 8.5.
72. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 3.
73. Id.
74. For a discussion of China’s move toward creating a high-tech economy, see infra Part V.D; see
also Keith Bradsher, As China Surges, It Draws High-Tech Researchers from America, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 18, 2010, at A1 (“Companies—and their engineers—are being drawn [to China] more and more
as China develops a high-tech economy that increasingly competes directly with the United States.”).
75. David Barboza, China Poised to Lead World in Patent Filings, N.Y. Times: Economix (Oct. 6,
2010, 12:14 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/china-poised-to-lead-world-in-patentfilings/.
76. Outline, supra note 7; see Wechsler, supra note 10, at 41–42.
77. Outline, supra note 7, ¶ 4.
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which the Outline and subsequent SPC notices and circulars address the
issues present in both DS362 and the broader IP fields.
A. Criminal Prosecution Thresholds: Copyright and Trademark
As discussed in Part II.A, there is a relatively high evidence threshold
for WTO challenges under TRIPS Article 61 and what constitutes an
operation on the level of commercial scale. There are several possible
remedies to meet this evidence threshold. Scholars have suggested that
companies in China keep records of IPR infringements and other possible
WTO violations and provide input to industry associations and
78
governments where appropriate. Such actions would enable the
government to better track infringement levels.
The Outline makes advances in this regard. The Outline calls for the
development of a national public service platform for basic information
79
on IP. Furthermore, it calls for the strengthening of the role of
80
industrial associations and support of their IP work. The Outline
devotes an entire section to developing IP human resources, calling for
the establishment of an interdepartmental coordination mechanism and
accelerated development of national and provincial IP expert databases
81
and professional information networks. These advancements may
increase communication about IPRs and enable the PRC to meet its
obligations post-DS362.
The SPC materials also make some advances on criminal prosecution
thresholds. The March 2009 SPC circular, entitled “Opinions of the
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation
of the National Intellectual Property Strategy,” devotes part of its
82
discussion to criminal infringement. One goal stated in the circular is
“[t]o strengthen the judicial protection of intellectual property,
stringently crack down on criminal infringement on intellectual property
in accordance with law and fully exert its functions of punishing and
83
deterring the criminals.” The circular notes that with regard to repeated
infringements, class infringements, and large-scale piracy, the SPC
should assist the relevant departments in carrying out “special activities”
84
for focused protection. Such special activities may include the SPC’s
plans to unify and regulate conditions and standards for the application
of criminal punishment. They may also include its aims to safeguard

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See, e.g., Bohanes & Emch, supra note 1, at 20.
Outline, supra note 7, ¶ 52.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶¶ 59–62.
Mar. 29, 2009 SPC Opinion, supra note 9, ¶ 21.
Id.
Id.
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85

victims’ rights to pursue criminal prosecution. Such aims on behalf of
the SPC, while not addressing criminal prosecution thresholds
specifically, suggest a broader policy of continuing to enforce criminal
prosecution of IP infringement.
Some scholars, however, are less optimistic about the effect that
future development of criminal prosecution thresholds will have on
piracy rates. As discussed in Part II.A, the WTO Panel did not consider
86
the evidence sufficient to find in the United States’ favor. Moreover,
even if the WTO Panel had considered the evidence sufficient, changing
87
the thresholds might not have had the desired effect. In 2007, for
example, certain enforcement thresholds were halved, but this reduction
88
did not cause a drop in piracy rates. Furthermore, U.S. copyright
holders estimate that losses in 2009 due to piracy were approximately
$3.5 billion for the music recording and software industries alone, and
these figures indicate little or no overall improvement over the previous
89
Therefore, while national pronouncements may indicate
year.
intentions to improve in this area, actual improvement may take much
longer, assuming such pronouncements are implemented and enforced
and are not just a delay tactic.
B. Customs Measures: Trademark
As opposed to the issue of criminal prosecution thresholds, the
Outline does not focus on the PRC’s customs measures to a great degree.
The Outline does briefly discuss the issue in its section on improving IP
law enforcement:
Customs law enforcement and border protection of intellectual property
need to be strengthened to maintain order in import and export and
improve the reputation of China’s export commodities. International
cooperation in customs law enforcement needs to be fully utilized in
order to effectively crack down on cross-border illegal acts and crimes
involving intellectual property. Customs need to have a[n] influence on
90
international intellectual property protection.

Thus, while the language in the Outline suggests China’s customs
law enforcement of IPRs needs to be improved, it does not specifically
address China’s TRIPS-related obligations or the particular problems
with regard to confiscated counterfeit trademark goods. The PRC seems
less concerned with this specific aspect of the United States’ case.
Although the Outline was issued before DS362 was officially decided,

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
See supra Part II.A.
Creemers, supra note 25, at 572.
Id.
USTR 2010 Report to Congress, supra note 25, at 5.
Outline, supra note 7, ¶ 48.
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the United States filed the complaint over a year prior, so China was
aware of the specific IPR issues that the United States had raised. It is
also possible that China chose not to address the TRIPS-related violation
in the Outline because it feared that doing so might prejudice its position
in the ongoing WTO dispute.
The Outline and SPC circulars, however, do devote substantial
discussion to the overall improvement and enforcement of trademark
protection. The April 2009 circular contains an entire section focused on
trademark protection, entitled, “Enhancing the business logo protection,
actively promoting the development of brand economy, regulating the
91
market order, and protecting fair competition.” This emphasis on
promoting the development of a “brand economy,” in particular, is
consistent with the more proactive, pro-innovation IP approach that
China has been demonstrating recently. In this circular, the SPC praises
the market value of well-known brands and pledges to strengthen the
92
protection of these brands in accordance with the law. The SPC also
aims to improve judicial policies on trademarks, strengthen the
protection of trademark rights, and further foster the creation of
93
independent brands. Additionally, the SPC discusses balancing the
actual use of registered trademarks and assignments of civil liabilities to
94
encourage greater trademark use.
Although the Outline and SPC materials do not expressly address the
customs measures claim from DS362, they do devote substantial attention
to greater enforcement and protection of trademark rights. This
significant attention is not only consistent with China’s proactive
approach, but also bodes well for the future development of China’s brand
economy and improvements in IP policy with respect to trademark rights.
C. Copyright Law
Remedying the copyright issue may take more effort than simply
rewriting the law. Although the Copyright Law has been amended as a
result of DS362, the amendment’s real effect on piracy in China may be
95
quite small. Agreements in the 1990s that resulted in stronger IPR
96
legislation in China did not significantly reduce IPR infringement rates.
The USTR acknowledged that U.S. copyright holders continue to report
97
severe losses due to piracy in China. Specifically, trade in pirated optical
discs is thriving, “[s]mall retail shops continue to be the major commercial

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Apr. 21, 2009 SPC Notice, supra note 9, § III.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
Creemers, supra note 25, at 572.
Id.
USTR 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 25, at 19.
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outlets for pirated movies and music,” and the theft of software, books,
98
and journals remains concerning. Nonetheless, remedying the inherent
difficulties in Article 4 is important, at least symbolically, because that
provision serves as the link between copyright law and media control by
99
the Chinese government.
The Outline takes a mixed approach to the copyright issue. Its
copyright-specific language focuses on protection of China’s domestic
100
IP. The Outline proposes to assist the development of copyrightrelated industries, but later curbs that general pronouncement by
pledging to “support the creation of works with clear national features
and characteristics of the times” and to “assist in the creation of excellent
101
cultural works that have difficulties in market competition.” Implicit in
this latter language is China’s continuing prioritization of works that pass
its content-review process over works that do not. The Outline also
discusses piracy and the improvement and promotion of the
102
commercialization of copyrights. With regard to piracy in particular,
the Outline aims to increase the punishment for piracy and to curb the
103
“large-scale production, selling and dissemination of pirated products.”
Thus far, bringing Article 4 of the Copyright Law into compliance
with TRIPS does not necessarily equate to a reduction in copyright
infringement. This disconnect may be due mainly to enforcement
problems, which will be discussed in Part V. Additionally, the Outline
does not prioritize the Article 4 issue present in DS362, and it continues
to prioritize works that pass its review process without discussion of
those works that are otherwise prohibited. Finally, the language
concerning copyright protection seems less nuanced and pronounced
than the Outline’s parallel language regarding trademark infringement.

V. China’s Implementation of IPR Goals in Practice
Implementation of the IPR goals in the Outline and SPC materials
is ongoing. Officials from various government bodies including the
Ministry of Commerce, the State Intellectual Property Office, and the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce jointly pledged at a
recent news conference to make IPR protection a “long-term” national
104
task. He Hua, Vice-Commissioner of the State Intellectual Property
Office, has stated that China has “achieved remarkable progress on the

98. Id.
99. Creemers, supra note 25, at 572.
100. Outline, supra note 7, ¶ 25.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. ¶¶ 26–27.
103. Id. ¶ 27.
104. Improved IPR Protection to Support Innovation, People’s Daily Online (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7318677.html.
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strategy during the past two years and more, but there is still much room
for improvement” and that the country is “strongly committed to
strengthening efforts on IPR protection to achieve China’s target of
105
building itself into an innovation-oriented nation.” It is unclear,
however, to what extent these goals have actually been implemented
rather than simply pronounced. Since 2008, sixteen departments in China
have drafted IPR strategy guidelines, and ministries have launched more
106
than 400 measures nationwide from 2009 to 2010.
A. Law Enforcement in China
A major obstacle to effective implementation of the IPR goals set
forth in the Outline is the low quality of Chinese law enforcement. Long
delays in enforcement actions, in addition to the oftentimes arbitrary and
nontransparent nature of the actions, are a major complaint of foreign
107
companies in China. Additionally, local authorities are often the
108
primary personnel in the enforcement efforts. Because infringing
enterprises are often an important local source of revenue and
employment, local authorities may be reluctant to enforce new or more
109
stringent IP laws for fear of jeopardizing this revenue source. Finally,
protectionist attitudes, especially among local authorities, can have a
110
Such protectionist
significant influence on enforcement of IPRs.
tendencies may take substantial time to change, despite the Outline and
other efforts by the national government.
The quality of enforcement of IPRs also varies greatly by region.
For example, Jiangsu Province recently recognized the importance of
IPR protection by imposing a severe criminal sentence in a high-profile
111
software piracy case. This same province, which is home to many of the
world’s leading exporters of electronic equipment, focuses on promoting
112
high technology. In Guangzhou Province, however, which is also one of
China’s largest manufacturing regions, counterfeit manufacturing is
113
prevalent. Fines and penalties are not deterring criminals, and the
number of criminal IPR cases that are initiated is too low to bring about
114
any real improvement in the region. The USTR has reported that IPR
enforcement at the local level is “hampered by poor coordination among
Chinese government ministries and agencies, local protectionism and
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Weinstein & Fernandez, supra note 13, at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
USTR 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 25, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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corruption, high thresholds for initiating investigations and prosecuting
criminal cases, lack of training, and inadequate and non-transparent
115
processes.”
116
A case involving Baidu, the leading search engine in China, is
illustrative of this law enforcement roadblock. In 2010, Baidu was found
117
guilty of violating copyright on music lyrics found on its service.
118
However, the fine was only $8000. Such a fine pales in comparison to
those levied in the United States, such as the $2.4 million fine levied
119
against Jammie Thomas-Rasset for pirating twenty-four music tracks.
Assessing a mere $8000 fine against a Chinese company that has the vast
majority of the country’s market share is unlikely to deter future IP
120
violations. Thus, inadequate fines and penalties, in addition to other
factors noted above, make ineffective law enforcement a major obstacle
to full implementation of China’s IPR goals.
B. Signs of Nascent Pressure from Domestic IP Creators
Despite problems with law enforcement, there are signs that
domestic IP creators are beginning to exert some pressure in order to
protect and enforce their IPRs. The case of Baidu and its e-book system
121
is apposite here. Baidu Books is a platform built and operated by
Baidu, which allows web users to browse and download documents and
122
other materials from a variety of sources. It is similar to Google Books.
Baidu Books has grown rapidly, and there are now almost 200 million
123
different books and materials available. The distribution of many of
124
these works is not authorized by either the authors or the publishers.

115. Id. at 23.
116. Kit Eaton, Baidu, Accused Globally of Aiding Piracy, Acts to Quash It in China, Fast
Company (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.fastcompany.com/1742395/baidu-accused-globally-of-aidingpiracy-acts-to-quash-it-in-china (“[Baidu] owns about 70% of China’s search market and represents
the online search connection for hundreds of millions of people.”).
117. Kit Eaton, China’s Baidu Rips off Copyrighted Content, Fined Just a Tiny Bit, Fast Company
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/1559701/baidu-copyright-infringement-lyrics-music-legalchina-copyright-ip.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Kristina Sepetys & Alan Cox, Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Trends in
Litigation and Economic Damages 2 (NERA Econ. Consulting, Topics in Law and Economics in
China, Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330619 (“We find that, under the
administrative systems established in China, penalties and fines for IPR violations generally do not
appear to provide adequate deterrence to would-be infringers. Fines are so low that they appear to
allow infringers to earn an adequate profit, even if caught and fined. Consequently, most studies
suggest that fines represent only a tiny fraction of the estimated sales revenue lost to IPR holders.”).
121. Baidu Books, Baidu, http://wenku.baidu.com (last visited May 1, 2012).
122. Hu Yong, Can We Tolerate Baidu’s “Evil” Stand on IP Rights?, China Media Project (Mar.
25, 2011), http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/03/25/11140.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Baidu Books’ copyright violations, however, have not gone
unnoticed. A “March 15 Letter by Chinese Writers” accused the service
of violating the rights of writers, stating that Baidu has “stolen our works
away. They have stolen our rights away. They have stolen our property.
125
Baidu Books has become a market for stolen goods.” Han Han,
126
China’s most popular blogger, wrote an open letter to Robin Li, the co127
founder of Baidu. Han Han reported Baidu’s alleged response to
complaints of copyright violations, stating:
[W]hen the discussions kicked off yesterday, it turned out you sent a
few arrogant mid-level managers, who from start to finish denied that
Baidu Library violated any intellectual property rights whatsoever.
These guys claim that your 2.8 million archived documents, which
include pretty much every single work ever published in this country, do
not violate any copyright, that it is your users who upload the content
128
and share it with everyone, and that you are merely a platform.

Han Han asked Baidu Books to voluntarily respect and protect copyrights,
so that one day, “Baidu Library will . . . become a source of livelihood for
Chinese authors, unlike today, where [Baidu Library has] become the
129
industry’s enemy and target of public criticism.” Such organization by
Chinese writers in opposition to Baidu, in addition to China’s most
popular blogger and published author voicing his disapproval, illustrate
that there is at least some pushback by domestic IP creators in China.
Baidu’s monopolistic market share, creates difficulties for domestic
authors attempting to remedy these violations. The China Written Works
Copyright Society has stated:
After rights violations by Baidu Books occurred, they might at least
have come out with a proposal to resolve the issue, actively negotiating
with Chinese copyright holders, but Baidu’s attitude throughout has
been cold and indifferent. Baidu has seized on the weakness that while
China’s copyright laws are in place, they are imperfect and incomplete.
They are playing a game of words, but have a weak sense of social
responsibility. They have also seized on this psychology among Chinese
130
web users that it’s great for everything to be free.

Han Han has recognized the lack of influence that Chinese authors
have, noting that “many Chinese authors are forced to give away their
131
intellectual property for free on Baidu.” Furthermore, Han Han explains

125. Id.
126. Joel Martinsen, Han Han Seizes Blogging Crown from Xu Jinglei, Danwei Blogs (Sept. 26,
2008), http://www.danwei.org/blogs/han_han_seizes_the_blogging_cr.php.
127. Biography: Robin Li, Baidu, http://ir.baidu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=188488&p=irol-govBio&ID=
143589 (last visited May 1, 2012).
128. Han Han, A Letter to Robin Li, Han Han Dig.: China’s #1 Blogger Translated (Mar. 26,
2011), http://www.hanhandigest.com/?p=369.
129. Id.
130. Hu Yong, supra note 122.
131. Han Han, supra note 128.
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that these authors have never asked Baidu for a share of the profits and
have “put up with the insults of Baidu supporters, and the contempt of
132
Baidu employees during negotiations.” Han Han concludes his plea to
Robin Li: “You are now the country’s number one entrepreneur. As a
role model for others, the time has come to make your position known
133
on the damage done to the publishing industry by Baidu Library.”
Thus, even though domestic IP creators are beginning to voice their
resistance, change is not automatic.
Signs of domestic pressure are apparent outside of the Baidu
context as well. Chinese society may be becoming more litigious,
134
especially with respect to IP, and Chinese IP owners seem to be less
hesitant than in the past to enforce their rights against other Chinese
135
infringers. One report stated that Chinese courts accepted 40% more
IPR cases in 2010 as companies and individuals increasingly sought legal
136
protection for patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Interestingly, the
same report noted that there was little change in the number of cases
137
involving foreign entities.
This increase in the amount of IP litigation in China is not due to
the efforts of the United States or other Western countries. Instead, the
vast majority of IP cases are brought by Chinese companies and
138
individuals, not foreign entities. For example, of the 23,518 firstinstance IPR civil cases resolved by Chinese courts of law in 2008, only
139
1139 involved foreign parties, a rate of about 4.8%. One scholar noted
the “peculiar absence of foreign intellectual property owners as litigants
among the tens of thousands of cases involving intellectual property
140
rights in China.” In 2006, of the 14,056 first-instance IPR civil cases
resolved by Chinese courts of law, only 353 involved foreign parties
141
(about 2.5%). Therefore, while the percentage of IP cases brought by
foreign entities is growing, many more cases on the whole are being
brought by domestic entities: an increase of 8676 cases brought by
domestic entities from 2006 to 2008, versus an increase of 786 cases
brought by foreign entities during that time. Domestic IP owners
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New China’s Intellectual
Property Regime, 55 St. Louis U. L.J. 773, 774 (2011).
135. Id.
136. China Court Hears More Intellectual Property Cases, Bloomberg BusinessWeek (Apr. 18,
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9MMG4N02.htm.
137. Id.
138. Nguyen, supra note 134, at 797.
139. China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2008, Ministry Com. P.R.C. (June 1, 2009),
http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policyarticle/policy/documents/200906/263973_5.html.
140. Nguyen, supra note 134, at 806.
141. Report on China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2006, Ministry Com. P.R.C. (June 5,
2007), http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/policyarticle/policy/documents/200706/236401_9.html.
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continue to bring more cases each year, illustrating the increasing
importance of IP and a growing recognition that the legal system can be
an effective way to enforce their property rights.
Not only is the amount of IP litigation increasing, but plaintiffs in
these cases have been more successful than in the past. A summary
report analyzing trends indicated that for each year between 2006 and
2009, the plaintiff in an IP dispute could expect to win, at least partially,
142
more than 75% of the time. This figure includes both “Win Outcomes,”
or judgments “where the court recogni[z]es some or all of the plaintiff’s
claims and awards remedies in all of the categories of relief sought by the
143
plaintiff (e.g., apology, injunction, damages and costs),” and “Partial
Win Outcomes,” or judgments “where the court recogni[z]es some or all
of the plaintiff’s claims and awards remedies in some (but not all) of the
categories of relief sought by the plaintiff (e.g., damages and costs, but no
144
apology or injunction).” This figure also includes all venues, IPRs,
causes of action, and industries within the broader civil IP litigation field;
145
it analyzes 5506 relevant judgments. Therefore, such an increase is yet
another sign of burgeoning domestic pressure in the IP context, in
addition to hopefully stronger legal protections and greater awareness of
IP law within China itself.
C. International Pressure
International pressure, specifically from the United States, may also
help to offset the enforcement roadblock and may ameliorate the state of
IP enforcement in China. The United States took notice of Baidu’s IP
violations and as a result, the USTR listed Baidu as a key member on its
146
list of global counterfeit-assisting services. Baidu reacted to these
complaints and issued anti-piracy technology for Baidu Books shortly
147
thereafter.
Han Han has noted this discrepancy between Baidu’s IP violations—
and the subsequent response within China—and the image it seeks to
project externally, especially to the United States. Han Han explains in
his letter to Robin Li:
[Y]ou must be aware what would happen if tomorrow you would
launch “Baidu America”, and then make all books and music
published in the US available for free. You won’t do that, and you

142. CIELA Summary Report: Trend by Year, CIELA (Mar. 4, 2011) http://www.ciela.cn/Search/
TrendByYearResult.aspx?. CIELA is a litigation database that provides statistical analysis of civil IP
litigation cases in China. The service has analyzed and compiled key data from more than 10,000
published IP judgments and settlements across all major IP courts in China since 2006. Id.
143. Id. (scroll cursor over the “W” under “Outcome”).
144. Id. (scroll cursor over the “P” under “Outcome”).
145. Id.
146. Eaton, supra note 116.
147. Id.
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won’t tell the American people that you’re merely a platform either,
that it has nothing to do with you, that it’s the users uploading the
content, and that the spirit of the internet is sharing. It is precisely
because you know this that today you have only set up shop in China.
148
You also know who can be bullied, and who cannot.

Even though Baidu has thus far been able to create and run a
service within China that violates the rights of Chinese IP holders,
presumably such a system would not thrive in the United States. In 2009,
when Google Books was condemned by Chinese writers for the
unauthorized scanning of Chinese works, the China Written Works
Copyright Society held three separate discussions with Google to remedy
149
the situation, and Google issued a formal apology and proposed a
150
mediation payment scheme. Baidu Books could learn from Google’s
efforts to appease the demands of Chinese IP creators, and pressure from
the United States may help to reduce IPR infringement problems.
The United States has pressured China in other IP-related contexts.
In October 2010, the State Council launched a six-month campaign to
reduce the number of pirated goods and to strengthen patent, trademark,
and copyright protection on a range of goods made both in China and
151
abroad. This campaign began just before President Hu Jintao’s state visit
to the United States in January 2011 and was one of the government’s
152
most intensive IPR protection initiatives to date. Regardless of China’s
motivations for launching the campaign, Chinese officials investigated over
153
45,000 cases of IPR violations. While the campaign may not be strong
evidence of systemic change or improvement, it did result in positive
implications for the state of IPRs in China, at least in the short-term.
D. Changes in China’s Domestic Economy
China’s move toward a high-tech economy might do more to foster
IPR protection than could any international pressure that China faces.
Politburo Standing Committee Member He Guoqiang recently called for
“greater efforts to develop new high-tech industries . . . to accelerate the
154
transformation” of China’s economy. In the past few years, Shanghai
has intensified its efforts to develop high-tech industries, including
developing nine specific high-tech sectors such as clean energy and civil
155
aviation manufacturing. He Guoqiang has stated that “enhancing

148. Han Han, supra note 128.
149. Hu Yong, supra note 122.
150. Id.
151. People’s Daily Online, supra note 104.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Senior Chinese Official Calls for Efforts to Develop New High-Tech Industries, People’s
Daily Online (May 26, 2011), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/7392302.html.
155. Id.
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innovative capacity is the key to changing the way China’s economy
156
operates.”
Shanghai is just one example of increasing technological innovation
throughout the country. U.S. companies are drawn to China as it
develops a high-tech economy that increasingly competes with the
United States; a few American companies are even making deals with
157
Chinese companies to license Chinese technology. China is the world’s
largest market for automobiles and desktop computers, and the country
158
also has the most Internet users.
This emphasis on greater technological innovation bodes well for
China’s IPR regime. As China innovates and develops its own domestic
IP, the country will want to protect such innovation. A recent Chinese
news article stated that “innovation and resulting IP will increasingly
serve as core elements of China’s economic development,” and that “the
rule of law is crucial to China’s drive for greater scientific and
159
technological innovation.” The article also outlined the view that
China’s current priority is research and development, and that China is
160
committed to protecting its assets with its evolving IP system. Recent
statistics support such a view: In 2009, China spent 543.3 billion Yuan on
R&D, a 17.7% increase over 2008; by the end of 2009, 1,193,000 of the
161
1,520,000 total patents registered in China were domestic. China Law
Blog listed “stepped up IP enforcement” as one of the top business law
trends in China for 2010, explaining that for technology licensing
agreements to have premium value to Chinese companies that enter into
162
them, there must be adequate IPR enforcement within China.
President Hu Jintao has himself stressed the importance of IP protection
for Chinese companies: “Nowadays, the competition in information
technology is extremely fierce. I hope you, as a software company, will
treasure technological innovation as your life. You need to own
intellectual property rights for your products. I hope you will be pioneers
163
in the development of our country’s software industry.” As China
innovates, its protection of IPRs will improve as well.

156. Id.
157. Bradsher, supra note 74.
158. Id.
159. Innovation, IP to Be Core Element of China’s Economic Growth, People’s Daily Online
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7154462.html.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Dan Harris, China Law 2010. Stepped Up IP Enforcement Is the Sixth Trend., China L. Blog
(Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2010/01/china_law_2010_the_sixth_trend.html.
163. President Hu Stresses Importance of Technological Innovation in Zhuhai, China Intell. Prop.
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Conclusion
The PRC’s Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy
and subsequent SPC notices and circulars indicate that China has shifted
to a more proactive and pro-innovation IP policy, beyond merely
responding to WTO accession obligations. This overall shift is likely due
to China’s increasing emphasis on innovation and creating a high-tech
164
economy.
Although China has adopted the WTO Panel’s findings in DS362,
the Outline and SPC notices do not explicitly address all of the issues
raised. In particular, the link between copyright protection and media
control implicit in Article 4 of the Copyright Law is not adequately
addressed in any of these materials. This is a contentious issue for China
and is likely to cause much internal dissent. Additionally, implementation
of the goals in the Outline and SPC materials still faces roadblocks, such as
problems regarding law enforcement. Increasing pressure from domestic
IP creators within China, in addition to continued pressure from the
United States and continued changes in China’s economy, may slowly
remedy these IPR violations.
The United States’ claims in DS362 were the result of extensive
lobbying by U.S. copyright and trademark holders, who claimed that
they were losing a substantial part of the potential Chinese market to
165
pirated or counterfeited products. Without substantial change in China,
the U.S. government will continue to face pressure to initiate claims
166
against China. Hopefully, the implementation of the Outline and SPC
notices will remedy many of the issues present in DS362 and will foster
greater cooperation between the United States and China in the IP
arena, especially as the two countries’ economies become increasingly
connected and China continues its high-tech rise.

164. See supra Part V.D.
165. Creemers, supra note 25, at 572.
166. Id.
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